Improving Institutional Decision-Making

Improving Institutional Decision-Making

Core Materials

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Legal Priorities Project Research Agenda, β€œInstitutional Design” (pp. 83-98); Flexible Constitutions (6.1.3 at p. 84) (30 mins)
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Klarman, M., β€œBrown v. Board of Education: Law or Politics?” Virginia Public Law and Legal Research Papers (long - feel free to skim)

Optional Reading

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The Question of Evidence (35 mins.) - Test your ability to form accurate beliefs.

Discussion Questions

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Do you think there is a way to disentangle institutional design from political power? (i.e. - will those with the power to decide what incentives are ever choose incentives likely to conflict with their retention of power?)
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What are some externalities (positive or negative) that societies fail to internalize? Are there ways of internalizing them without wielding political power?
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What would a consequence- or utility-based legal rule look like? Can you think of a reliable means for enforcing such a rule, absent political will?
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What would an effective longtermist international institution look like? What would be needed for it to come about? How would we gauge its effectiveness and what incentives would dictate its behavior?
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What role does legal interpretation have to play in bringing about positive social/legal change? How does it compare to legislative or cultural change? Are there instances where legal interpretation is more or less tractable than those?